Abstract: Substantial investments in biomedical research over the past 50 years have generated new technologies that have significantly decreased mortality and morbidity. While there appears to be broad consensus that the benefits of these new technologies and the research that generated them has exceeded their costs, there is also evidence from cost-effectiveness analyses and other analytic approaches that the benefits of some widely-used technologies may not exceed their costs. Similarly, recent proposals to increase Federal funding for biomedical research have faced questions concerning whether such additional funds would be a worthwhile investment or better allocated with greater attention to the burden of illness. This paper examines the prospects for harnessing the tools of medical cost-effectiveness to assess the expected value of research using a value of information framework. Though the theoretical and technical barriers to performing such calculations are formidable, value of information calculations based on the tools of cost-effectiveness analysis may help assess the value of research in a range of clinical contexts, including clinical trial design. In contrast, they seem unlikely to provide much insight into the value of basic research. Despite the circumscribed areas within which value of information calculations are likely to be feasible, they may have the potential to become an important tool to identify and maximize the value of research. Realizing this potential will require renewed attention to the methodological foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis and the rigorous application of those principles. However, even if such methods are developed to their maximum potential, they are best viewed as additions to, rather than substitutes for, good scientific judgement.
I. Introduction
Over the past several decades, the remarkable and unprecedented increase in health care expenditures throughout the world, but especially in the United States, has prompted increasing concerns that current levels of health care expenditures are excessive. Indeed it has been suggested that not only has medical care been provided beyond where its marginal benefits exceed its costs, but often into ranges where there is little or no benefit. Examples of such "flat of the curve" medical care (Enthoven, 1980) , and concerns that in some instances medical interventions may even have been applied to the point of doing harm, have provided key motivation for the growth of efforts to identify when specific medical treatments are beneficial and worth their costs.
The importance of determining when specific medical technologies are worthwhile has been intensified in recent years with the growing recognition that increases in health care costs have been largely driven by the development and diffusion of new medical technologies. Analysis of the sources of medical cost growth suggest that, of the 2.5% annual growth in medical expenditures in the U.S. since 1960 relative to the rest of the economy, 1.6% was due to growth in the relative quantity of health care, while only 0.9% was due to growth in the relative price of health care (Fuchs, 1990) . However, work by Joseph Newhouse and colleagues (Newhouse (1992) and Cutler, McClellan, Newhouse and Remler, (1998) ) has suggested that much of the apparent growth in the medical consumer price index is itself due to unmeasured improvements in quality. This implies that growth in medical technology is the primary, if not sole, reason for growth in health expenditures.
The immediate implication of this finding is that controlling health care costs will ultimately require controlling the development and diffusion of medical technology. In accomplishing this goal, reimbursement systems that provide both developers and users of technologies with the appropriate incentives both to control costs and to produce quality health care are essential. Nevertheless, they are not sufficient since they do not provide the tools to figure out how to accomplish those objectives through specific decisions about individual technologies. It is interesting in that regard that there is no convincing evidence that the costs within managed care plans have grown at any lesser rate than costs outside of managed care plans (Smith et al., 1998) . Moreover, it appears that often little of the savings of managed care plans is due to lower utilization but is instead due to more effective bargaining with providers (Lindrooth, 1998) . These findings suggest that managed care plans have had difficulty in addressing the problem of technology assessment. On the patient side, patient incentives for cost containment (such as co-payments) may play some role (Manning et al., 1987) . However, their effectiveness is constrained by the fact that the majority of health expenditures are consumed by a small fraction of the population with very high costs (Berk et al., 1988) and the willingness of most people to face financial risks of such magnitude is limited. This again reinforces the position that decisions to limit the use of specific medical technologies are likely crucial if costs are to be contained.
However, many of these new technologies have substantial health benefits and, as many of the papers to be discussed here suggest, people appear to place high valuations on the improvements in health that have taken place in recent decades (Cutler and Richardson, 1997; Murphy and Topel, 1998; Nordhaus, 1999) . This suggests that indiscriminate reductions in the provision of health care could easily result in losses in welfare. Nevertheless, the high average benefit of medical technology does not appear to be matched by high marginal benefit in many instances. This has been evident in many empirical analyses of the expansion of access to medical care among people who are already have fairly good access to medical care. In experiments such as the RAND health insurance experiment (Manning et al. 1987) , and in observational studies in which quasi-experimental techniques have been used to look at "exogenous" increases in access (McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse 1994 ), it has not been possible to show any significant improvement in health outcomes. Thus, a central challenge in ensuring the efficient allocation of resources for health care and for health care research is to identify technologies whose incremental benefits are worth their costs. It is in response to this that the field of medical technology assessment has arisen, with the majority of analyses performed using the techniques of one particular approach: medical cost-effectiveness analysis.
Likewise, as people have questioned when medical treatments are "worth it", they have also understandably asked when medical care research is likely to be worthwhile. Are current levels of spending too little or too great? Are we spending our research dollars on the right opportunities? The papers to be discussed here suggest that the value of improvements in health that have arisen over the past several decades is likely to far exceed the costs of the medical care and medical care research that have been devoted to accomplishing such gains. To the extent one believes that these gains in health have resulted from medical expenditure and medical research, this work suggests that these expenditures have not only been "worth it", but actually major contributors to increasing welfare. If this is accepted, then it is in turn tempting to conclude that additional increases are justified. It is absolutely possible that this is the case. However, even if such expenditures have been worthwhile on average, it is another set of questions what their value is at the margin, and whether research funds are being allocated to the correct opportunities. Indeed, both Congress and the National Institutes of Health (NIH) have faced increasing pressures from disease-specific interest groups in recent years to justify their decisions about resource allocation, and questions such as these have been of sufficient concern to Congress that they have played a role in recent discussions about increased funding for research and led Congress to request the advice of the Institute of Medicine on whether priorities for the allocation of funds at NIH have been appropriate (IOM, 1998) . Indeed, while the resulting IOM report did not conclude that medical expenditures to date have been allocated incorrectly, it did conclude that NIH should pay greater attention to the burden of illness in assessing priorities for research. Following on this, others have suggested that NIH could better identify the most promising projects if it took greater advantage of formal approaches to assess the burden of illness and opportunities for research to lessen the burden of illness (Tengs, et al., 1998) . In a similar vein, but with a different perspective on current approaches to resource allocation, a recent article in the New England Journal of Medicine has argued that in fact NIH funds have been allocated consistent to a large degree with certain broad measures of the burden of illness (Gross, et al, 1999) . In commenting on this, NIH Director Harold Varmus has reasonably asked to what extent such measures of the burden of illness either capture the true burden of illness or should factor in the setting of priorities for research as opposed to scientific opportunity, especially given the importance of basic research in the advancement of medicine and the difficulty of predicting where the products of basic research will be of value (Varmus, 1999) . This paper builds on recent work in the theoretical foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis to examine the potential for formal technology assessment to help identify the value of specific medical technologies and the most promising avenues for future research. In analyzing this issue, the emphasis is placed on the tools of medical cost-effectiveness analysis because it has been the most widely used approach to assess the value of specific medical technologies. The key message is that, just as medical cost-effectiveness analysis can provide insight into the value of medical interventions in specific contexts, it may have the potential to provide important insights into the value of biomedical research if applied in the right settings with methodological rigor and a thoughtful understanding of its strengths and limitations.
The paper begins with a critical review of the methodological foundations of medical costeffectiveness analysis. This suggests both the potential of these tools as well as a series of important challenges that must be addressed in any effort to use them, whether to value specific medical technologies or to value research opportunities. The paper then examines the prospects for harnessing the tools of medical cost-effectiveness to assess the expected value of research using a value of information framework. Though the theoretical and technical barriers to performing such calculations are formidable and essentially preclude the application of these approaches to the study of basic research, value of information calculations may be useful for assessing the value of research in a range of specific clinical contexts, including clinical trial design. Though the application of such techniques, even in these circumscribed areas, is in its infancy, they may have the potential to become an important tool to identify and maximize the value of research. Realizing this potential will require renewed attention to the methodological foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis and the rigorous application of those principles.
Even so, rational allocation of funds for research will require an understanding of the intrinsic limitations of these approaches and a continued reliance on the type of sound scientific judgement that has shaped the resource allocation process to date.
II. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Medical Interventions
As a first step in understanding the potential for the tools of medical technology assessment to inform priorities for biomedical research, it is important to understand the strength and limitations of the tools in assessing the value of medical care. Because medical technology assessment is a large and active area of research, a comprehensive review is not possible here. Nevertheless, a general knowledge of the approach and some of its key limitations, and the potential for addressing those limitations, is important to understanding the potential of applying the methods to help identify the value of research.
Scope and Origins of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
Since its origins with a handful of publications in the academic medical literature in the 1960s, medical technology assessment has grown at an accelerating rate, reaching nearly 1000 publications annually in recent years covering an immense range of specific applications within medicine (Elixhauser et al., 1998) . Interestingly, although the pioneering studies in medical cost-effectiveness analysis were done in the United States (Weinstein and Stason, 1976) , the greatest interest in the field over the past several decades has been in European countries and former British colonies, including Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This greater level of interest in these countries compared to the U.S. can likely be traced to the greater role played by national health systems in those countries and a variety of challenges to the idea of technology assessment in the United States, driven particularly by certain medical professional societies and pharmaceutical and medical device producers attempting to avoid regulation (Perry and Thamer, 1999) . Nevertheless, there has recently there has been increasing interest in technology assessment in the U.S. driven by private payers seeking to identify approaches to cost containment, and, not surprisingly, pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers attempting to market their products. In this context, interest in these techniques from within the pharmaceutical industry has been particularly intense. However, the high financial stakes for companies have led to concerns that what the industry has called "pharmacoeconomics" may not consistently provide objective evaluations, as well as to Food and Drug Administration attempts to develop guidelines for pharmacoeconomic evaluation (Neumann, et al. 1996 ).
This problem is clearly complicated by a series of important deficiencies in the methodological foundations of medical technology assessment. While some methods familiar to economists with clearly developed theoretical foundations, such as willingness-to-pay approaches to contingent valuation, have played some role in the field, they have been used in by far the minority of studies. The most commonly cited reasons that contingent valuation methods have not been more widely used are a reluctance to directly place a dollar value of health, concerns that such analyses will result in less attention to the health problems of the poor, and basic methodological concerns about the ability to measure people' s actual willingness to pay (Gold et al., 1996) . Instead, reflecting the origins of these analyses in medical decision analysis and quantitative psychology, the predominant approach has been that of cost-effectiveness analysis. Following this approach, interventions are ranked in terms of their cost per unit of benefit and those that offer the lowest cost per unit of benefit at the margin are selected. Application of this procedure generates cost-effectiveness ratios for a broad set of interventions that can then be listed in order of decreasing cost-effectiveness from top to bottom. Such a "league (Goldman, 1992) , but regardless of where the line is drawn, such rankings are useful because they suggest that one should always engage in activities at the top of the list before moving further down the list.
An Example of an Important Application of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis: Pap Smears A brief example of the application of cost-effectiveness analysis to a particular medical technology, Pap smears, may serve to illustrate the value of the approach. Because of their ability to detect cervical cancer while it is still easily treatable, regular Pap smears have become a key component of preventive health care for women, and indeed mortality from cervical cancer has fallen substantially in countries when cervical cancer screening has been implemented. Moreover the test is relatively inexpensive and has few risks. It may not be surprising, therefore, that a cost-effectiveness analysis by Eddy (1981) estimated an annual Pap smear to extend life at a cost of only $1,535 per year of life saved.
This example is consistent with the general impression emphasized by many of the papers to be presented here that the average value of medical care is high. However, cervical cancer generally progresses quite slowly, with 8 years on average passing from the time a lesion is first detectable to when to is no longer easily treated, and for this reason it is important to consider the incremental value of annual Pap smears relative to less frequent Pap smears. In Eddy' s analysis, the results are striking: a Pap smear done every three, two and one year -compared to no Pap smear -increased life expectancy by 70 days, 71 days, and 71 days and 8 hours. Thus the marginal gain from increasing the frequency from 3 to 2 years and from 2 to 1 year, are only one day, and 8 hours, respectively. In terms of marginal cost per year of life saved, performing the Pap smear every third year costs $521 per year of life saved, while moving from 3 to 2 years and from 2 to 1 year cost $18,250 and $165,909 per year of life saved, respectively. In a more recent analysis with somewhat improved epidemiological data (Eddy, 1990 ) and updated to 1996 dollars, the marginal cost of the annual Pap smear compared to one done every 2 years was $833,000 per year of life saved (Meltzer, 1997) . Based on this, most people would agree that the marginal value of an annual Pap smear relative to its cost is low. Based on these analyses, recommendations for women who have a history of normal Pap smears and no other risk factors are now for a Pap smear only every third year (U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 1996) . Similarly, increased efforts have been put into identifying women who have not recently had a Pap smear. Results of these screening initiatives suggest that they detect cancers that would otherwise have likely progressed shortly to generate both serious illness and high costs, and thus save both lives and money (Mandelblatt and Fahs, 1988) . Thus the cost-effectiveness analysis of Pap smears provides a prime example of how medical technology assessment can be used to shape the efficient use of technology.
Though not unique, the Pap smear example is certainly one of the more striking applications of these techniques by virtue of the large magnitude of the differences in average and marginal costeffectiveness of the intervention and the relative simplicity of the measure of benefit as years of life saved. But most medical technology assessments do not yield such striking results, and this makes attention to a variety of methodological and measurement issues in cost-effectiveness analysis crucial in determining the potential for these approaches to assist in the allocation of funds for biomedical research.
Some of these key methodological issues concern what perspective to take in performing costeffectiveness analysis, how to measure both costs and benefits, and what to do when there is uncertainty about those costs and benefits. Complicating the discussion of nearly all of these issues from the perspective of economic theory is that, although solid microeconomic principles provide the central justification for this approach (Weinstein and Zeckhauser, 1972; Weinstein, 1995; Gold et al., 1996) , researchers working on cost-effectiveness analysis have rarely returned to these first principles in addressing methodological issues. Indeed, despite involvement by some European economists, U.S.
economists have paid very little attention to the field; while medical journals and health economics specialty journals commonly publish articles on medical cost-effectiveness analysis, in the 14 major economics journals catalogued by JSTOR going back to the 1960s 1 , there is only one reference to medical cost-effectiveness analysis. Whether greater attention to the questions raised in medical costeffectiveness by mainstream economists could help advance the methods of cost-effectiveness analysis is not certain, but the current state of research in the area suggests that there are likely to be meaningful opportunities to advance the field. Nevertheless, understanding these important unresolved issues concerning the methodological foundations cost-effectiveness analysis is essential to developing a realistic assessment of the potential to apply these techniques to assess opportunities for research.
Perspective
Some of the most fundamental ambiguities concerning the measurement of costs and benefits for cost-effectiveness analysis relate to the choice of perspective. This could be the perspective of a specific entity, such an individual, family, HMO, or Medicare, or a societal perspective that incorporates all costs and benefits regardless of to whom they accrue. Though more narrow, the perspectives of individual entities may be particularly useful in understanding the incentives faced by those entities. For example, the out-of-pocket cost of a prescribed treatment for a patient is likely to be a better predictor of that patient' s compliance with a regimen than the full price (or cost) of a drug. In contrast, the societal perspective is generally adopted when the goal is to identify interventions that may offer benefits to society as a whole. For this reason, the societal perspective has received increasing favor for use in costeffectiveness analysis, including the recommendation of the Panel on Cost-effectiveness in Health and Medicine which was convened by the Public Health Service to develop consensus on methods for costeffectiveness analysis (Gold et al., 1996) .
From the perspective of neoclassical economic analysis, the issues raised by this societal perspective are particularly challenging. In particular, the set of issues raised by the Arrow Impossibility Theorem suggest that, if the choice being analyzed is one that implies a distribution of outcomes across different members of society, there can be no non-dictatorial allocation algorithm that simultaneously satisfies a minimal set of assumptions concerning Pareto optimality, unrestrictedness of domain to individual preference orderings, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (Arrow, 1951) . Surely this result, which seems to have in general diminished the enthusiasm of economists for the field of social choice (See Sen, 1999 for a discussion of this), must also have diminished the interest in evaluating alternative allocations of social resources in health care through cost-effectiveness analysis as well.
Nevertheless, there are ways in which the choices analyzed through medical cost-effectiveness analysis may be seen as more consistent with neoclassical economic theory. For example, much as Harsanyi (1955) argued that if individuals in society are uncertain about their future utilities and maximize expected utility it may be possible to construct a social welfare function respecting their individual preferences, recent attempts to place cost-effectiveness analysis in a welfare-economic framework have relied on expected utility models that can also be understood as the result of expected utility maximization of a representative consumer (Garber and Phelps, 1997; Meltzer, 1997) . Whether or not one finds such arguments convincing, or indeed accepts the idea that the Arrow Theorem fundamentally undermines the concept of social welfare (Sen, 1999) , it seems that the area of health care evaluation is one of the most important areas for the ongoing debate about the possibility of meaningful representations of social choice.
Even once a choice of perspective is adopted, however, there remain crucial questions of how to measure costs and benefits that must also be answered in order to use these tools to help inform priorities for biomedical research.
Measuring the Benefits of Medical Interventions
In order to apply the principles of cost-effectiveness analysis across a range of medical interventions, it is necessary to develop a single metric that can capture the benefits of a broad class of medical interventions. This has been and remains a key challenge for cost-effectiveness analysis.
Compared to disease-specific measures such as the number of cancers detected or cured, effects on mortality, as measured by life-years saved, have the advantage of comparability across diseases, but unfortunately do not capture the important effects of medical care on quality of life. Recognition of this has led to the development of the concept of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), which was first applied in the context of evaluating the cost-effectiveness of the treatment of hypertension (Weinstein and Stason, 1976) .
Following this approach, each year of life is weighted by a factor between zero and one intended to reflect the quality of life in that year, where zero is equivalent to death and one to perfect health. These quality of life weights are most commonly derived by psychometric techniques based on responses to hypothetical choices. Some of these approaches have no discernable connection to theory whatsoever, but two common approaches can be fairly readily connected to neoclassical economic theory (Gold et al., 1996) . Specifically, these describe (1) choices between life with a given illness and a gamble involving life in perfect health and death with some probability (the standard gamble approach) or (2) choices between longer life with illness and a shorter life in full health (the time trade-off technique).
Despite the potential connection of these measures to economic theory, QALYs have been controversial. Indeed, while practitioners of cost-effectiveness analysis have often been surprisingly willing to proceed in the absence of evidence of validity of these measures, many economists have often been equally unwilling to consider whether these measures may be of value, especially given the known limitations of alternative approaches, such as contingent valuation approaches to willingness-to-pay (Pauly, 1995) . Nevertheless, quality-adjusted life expectancy has become the dominant outcome measure used in medical technology assessment and is used in the majority of the 1000 or so papers in medical technology assessment published annually. Moreover, QALYs were recently endorsed as the preferred measure of health benefits by the Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and Medicine that was convened by the Public Health Service to provide advice on techniques for the performance of medical technology assessments in the U.S. (Gold et al., 1996) . However, despite their popularity, serious questions about the validity of QALYs remain. A sampling of the more important questions about the validity of QALYs include their basic ability to capture the dimensions of health that people value, and to reflect how people value risk, prefer the present relative to the future, adapt to health limitations, or express variations in preferences. To date, the research that has examined the validity of QALYs as a measure of patient preferences has most commonly compared the results of using different methods of quality-of life assessment, for example the time trade-off versus the standard gamble (e.g. Blumenschein and Johannesson, 1998) . These studies have tended to find some correlation among these measures. However, the problem with this approach to the validation of QALYs is that it only implies that these different techniques are measuring something in common, and not that they reflect what people value in making health care decisions. At its essence, the problem is the absence of a "gold standard" that reflects what people value with respect to their health and health care.
This problem of identifying what people desire in seeking health care in fact arises far more broadly than in cost-effectiveness analysis. Indeed, it is faced on a daily basis by patients and clinicians alike and is generally addressed by attempts to inform patients and then help them choose the option that best reflects their preferences. While this mode of medical decision making may be chosen to some extent because of a belief in autonomy as of intrinsic value, the emphasis among both patients and doctors on informed consent also places a great deal of emphasis on individual variation in preferences, and the belief that informed choice is the most reliable way to identify those preferences. Even if they are not a perfect measure of individual preferences, however, informed choices are certainly a compelling standard by which to assess possible measures of patient preferences. This suggests that one way to assess the validity of quality of life measures is their ability to predict patient choices.
In recent work, colleagues and I have collected data on the stated and revealed preferences of patients with diabetes for intensive therapy to attempt to assess the validity of quality of life measures (Meltzer et al., 1998) . Intensive therapy for diabetes, which involves increased frequency of glucose checks and insulin dosing, has been shown to decrease long-term complications of diabetes such as blindness, amputation, and renal failure, but also requires greater effort by patients and can cause increased frequency of hypoglycemic events (Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, 1993) . As a result, intensive therapy would be expected to have affects on both the length and quality of life, and therefore is a natural context in which to look for effects on quality-adjusted life expectancy. In the study, we ask patients all the questions necessary following currently accepted techniques to assess their perceived gain in quality-adjusted life expectancy with intensive versus conventional therapy. These include time trade-off questions to elicit their beliefs about the quality of life associated with intensive versus conventional therapy and the complications associated with diabetes, questions about their beliefs concerning the effects of intensive therapy on the probability of complications, and questions designed to elicit their rate of time preference. We then use a published model of the effects of intensive therapy to calculate their predicted gain (or loss) in quality-adjusted life expectancy from intensive therapy (Diabetes Control and Complications Trial Research Group, 1996) .
Our results suggest that patients who believe that current quality of life would not be harmed by intensive therapy and patients who believe that intensive therapy is likely to be effective in reducing complications are more likely to choose intensive therapy. However, patients who believe that complications would more severely harm quality of life and patients who have lesser preference for the present over the future are not more likely to pursue intensive therapy. Thus the effects of these individual elements that go into the quality-adjusted life-year calculation are only partially consistent with the predictions underlying the quality-adjusted life year model. Nevertheless, when these factors are combined to calculate the change in quality-adjusted life years with intensive therapy, that change is found to be highly predictive of who chooses intensive therapy (just less than about 75% sensitive and 75% specific 2 ). One might conclude from this that despite reasonable theoretical concerns about their validity, quality-adjusted life years appear to do a fairly good job of reflecting people' s preferences.
However, the fact that people are reporting their answers to these questions knowing their choice of treatment suggests the possibility that their answers may be shaped by the decisions they have made (Festinger, 1957) . In particular, people who have chosen intensive therapy may minimize its negative effects on quality of life while people on conventional therapy may minimize the predicted reduction in complications with intensive therapy. Similarly, people who believe that the benefits of intensive therapy are large and who believe that the impositions required by the therapy are minor may be more likely to report themselves as following intensive therapy even when they actually follow conventional therapy.
Indeed, we find evidence that this is the case. Moreover, when we use the gain in quality-adjusted life years to predict actual therapy as defined by the frequency of glucose checks and insulin doses according to the DCCT, we find that quality-adjusted life years do an extremely poor job of predicting actual therapy, with a sensitivity and specificity of less than 60%. This suggests that much of the apparent ability of the change in quality-adjusted life years to predict choice reflects attempts to minimize cognitive dissonance.
To address the possibility that any correlation between a gain in quality-adjusted life years lived and choices reflects cognitive dissonance, what is needed are prospective studies of the ability of quality adjusted life-years to predict choice. These would examine whether patients' beliefs about the quality of life and likelihood of specific health outcomes related to medical interventions prior to facing decisions about those interventions predict the choices that they actually make. It will also be important to compare these measures to measures based on willingness to pay, which have been favored by economists. While it seems likely that that current measures based on quality-adjusted life expectancy will do very poorly, it seems equally likely that measures based on willingness-to-pay may do no better. Even such negative result would serve several goals. First, they would provide some solid information about the validity of current quality of life measures, and, in so doing, generate appropriate concern among those using those measures. Second, they would provide some concrete evidence about the relative merits of these measures and perhaps suggest when one or the other measure might be of more value. Third, and most importantly, they would propose a criterion, the ability to predict choices, by which improved quality of life measures might be generated and validated. Until such exercises have been completed, it is difficult to know whether the tools of quality of life measurement for cost-effectiveness have much ability to represent the factors that patients most value in seeking medical care. Nevertheless, the basic assumption behind QALYs -that the benefits of medical care cannot be fully measured by reductions in mortality and must also strive to reflect the value of improvements in morbidity -must nevertheless be correct.
Measuring the Costs of Medical Interventions
Though perhaps to a lesser extent than with the measurement of benefits, the measurement of costs in cost-effectiveness analysis has also generated controversies with potentially important implications for the use of the tools of cost-effectiveness analysis to inform priorities for biomedical research. Perhaps not surprisingly, some of these controversies can be traced to the lack of a solid theoretical foundation for medical cost-effectiveness analysis. Among the most long lasting of these controversies is a set of issues surrounding the treatment of future medical and non-medical costs related to medical interventions.
Indeed, for almost 25 years, there has been ongoing debate among researchers working in medical cost-effectiveness analysis about how to account for costs that occur following a medical intervention.
For example, when a person has cardiac bypass surgery and this averts the cost of a heart attack that would otherwise have occurred, should this be counted as a saving? Beyond these costs for "related" illnesses, if a person who would otherwise have died of a heart attack lives on to develop some other "unrelated" illness such as Alzheimer' s disease, should the costs of that be counted? What about consumption or earnings in added years of life?
Most commonly, cost-effectiveness analyses have tended to count only effects on costs for "related" illness, but without any rigorous justification for excluding other costs. One reason for this lack of rigor has been the absence of a clear theoretical framework in which to consider cost-effectiveness analysis. In 1995, Alan Garber and Charles Phelps made an important contribution towards developing such a framework in a National Bureau of Economic Research working paper that analyzed this question in the context of a model of lifetime utility maximization (Garber and Phelps, 1995) . Surprisingly, they found that the relative rankings of interventions were not affected if one included or excluded these future unrelated costs as long as they were truly unrelated (as defined by a conditional independence assumption) and they were consistently either included or excluded.
However, more complete analysis of this issue in the context of a more general lifetime utility maximization model that permits resources to be allocated over the life-cycle so that there can be net borrowing or lending at different ages, suggests that the Garber and Phelps results are in fact an artifact of an implicit assumption that future costs are zero (Meltzer, 1997; Meltzer, in press ). Indeed, the results of the analysis imply that in fact all future costs must be included -both medical -for related and unrelated illness -and non-medical (Meltzer, 1997) . Moreover, analyses that exclude future costs are generally biased to spend to favor interventions that extend life over interventions that improve the quality of life, especially in the elderly.
To understand the effects of including future costs, it is useful to consider the following approximation of the cost-effectiveness ratio in terms of cost per quality-adjusted life year (QALY) that includes future costs, where C is the average annual net resource use over the remainder of a person's life For elderly persons, among whom consumption generally exceeds production so that C is positive, the effect of including future costs is to increase the cost-effectiveness ratio in proportion to the cost per year of life lived and the ratio of changes in life expectancy to quality-adjusted life expectancy.
Thus analyses of interventions for the elderly that omit future costs favor interventions that extend life over interventions that improve quality of life.
For young adults, however, C is often negative since the expected present value of a young person's lifetime earnings is often greater than the expected present value of the person's lifetime medical and non-medical consumption. Studies that exclude such future costs would overestimate the true societal costs of treating young people whose net resource use over their remaining lifetime is negative.
Since few studies to date have examined the effects of i ncluding all future costs in costeffectiveness analyses, the above approximation is useful for developing estimates and intuition concerning how including future costs may effect the cost-effectiveness of medical interventions. Such estimates can be developed by combining age-specific estimates of future net resource use (e.g.
consumption plus medical expenditures minus earnings) with estimates of the effects of interventions on life expectancy and quality-adjusted life expectancy from published studies. An example of such an exercise is illustrated in Table 2 , which is reprinted from Meltzer (1997) , and clearly shows the potential for including future costs to change both the absolute and relative cost-effectiveness of medical interventions, especially when an intervention has much larger effects on length of life than quality of life.
Even if one adopts a $100,000 per QALY threshold for cost-effectiveness, the effects on the costeffectiveness of the treatment of hypertension, adjuvant chemotherapy for Duke' s C colon cancer, and end-stage renal disease for hemodialysis for 60 year old men reported at the bottom of the table suggest that these effects can be quantitatively significant.
Although the estimates based on the above approximation may provide some indication of the effects of including future costs on the cost-effectiveness of medical interventions, the accuracy of such approximations is not clear. One important reason that such approximations may be poor is that they implicitly assume that all mortality reductions resulting from a medical intervention occur immediately, which is certainly not the case for some (if not most) medical interventions. For example, less than two percent of the benefits of intensive therapy for diabetes among young adults in terms of increased life expectancy occur in the first two decades that intensive therapy is followed . This suggests the importance of developing estimates of the cost-effectiveness of medical interventions that directly incorporate future costs. Although the number of such estimates remains extremely limited and
do not yet include interventions that would be expected to have the largest effects on length of life relative to quality of life, a growing number of such estimates are now available (Table 3) , and again suggest the potential for changes in the relative cost-effectiveness of medical interventions when future costs are included. Thus, as with the issues surrounding perspective and the measurement of benefits, the issues surrounding measurement of costs demonstrate some of the important measurement issues the must be addressed if the tools of cost-effectiveness analysis are to provide a comprehensive framework with which to assess the value of opportunities for research.
III. Using Cost-Effectiveness to Inform Priorities for Research
In addition to the methodological challenges discussed above, one of the main challenges faced by medical cost-effectiveness analysis concerns how to perform sensitivity analyses to address uncertainty about the benefits and costs of medical interventions. It is through this set of methods that cost-effectiveness analysis can be used to inform priorities for research.
Although there have been many proposals about how to address uncertainty in cost-effectiveness analyses, it has probably not been adequately recognized that there may be multiple reasons to perform sensitivity analysis. These include: (1) to help a decision maker to make the best decision in the presence of uncertainty, (2) to identify the sources of uncertainty to guide decisions for individuals or subgroups with characteristics that differ from a base case, and (3) to set priorities for the collection of additional information. studies these problems by examining the implications of an expected utility maximization model for the optimal choice of medical interventions or the acquisition of additional information when there is uncertainty about the costs and benefits of the interventions. The results indicate that if the objective is to maximize expected utility given available information -as is implied, for example, by maximization of quality-adjusted life expectancy -and if financial risk is effectively diversified through either public or private insurance, then the optimal decision for any group is determined by the ratio of the expected cost divided by the expected benefit. However, if the objective of sensitivity analysis is to set priorities for the acquisition of additional information, the appropriate measure of benefit is the incremental increase in expected utility with additional information. It is through this latter approach that the tools of medical cost-effectiveness analysis and vast literature on the cost-effectiveness of specific medical interventions (Elixhauser et al., 1998) can potentially be used to help better identify the value of medical research. The sections that follow develop the basic framework for performing such calculations, and describe the challenges involved in performing such calculations, and illustrate some of their possible implications for the value of research. Though ideal value of information calculations may be difficult to perform, certain simpler approaches to sensitivity analysis are identified that may provide bounds on the value of information with less stringent data requirements.
Together, these approaches suggest a theoretically grounded approach through which the tools of medical decision analysis can be extended to inform priorities for research, but also the important limitations of such approaches.
Methods for Sensitivity Analysis
Before illustrating the derivation and applications of methods for performing sensitivity analysis, it is useful to discuss the existing methods.
The oldest and most commonly used forms of sensitivity analyses are univariate or multivariate sensitivity analyses that begin by calculating the costs and benefits assuming the mean or modal values of all the probabilities in the analysis and then vary those parameters individually across a range of possible outcomes to see how the cost-effectiveness of an intervention changes. In some instances, the parameter values are varied over the range of all possible values, while in other cases they are varied across confidence intervals that are drawn from the medical literature, or until some threshold for costeffectiveness is reached. Advantages of these analyses is that they permit the analyst to identify the effects of individual or groups of parameters on the analysis and that the results can be easily calculated and reported. However, the major problems with these sorts of analyses are that they do not clearly delineate either what range of parameter values to consider or what to do when some of those parameter values would change the optimal decision, and that they are very likely to lead to indeterminate results while providing little perspective on the likelihood and welfare consequences of those outcomes.
More recently, population-based sampling approach to estimating costs, effectiveness and costeffectiveness ratios, sometimes termed stochastic cost-effectiveness analysis, appear to be receiving increasing attention in the field (O'Brien et al., 1994; Gold et al., 1996; Polsky et al., 1997) . However, these analyses still do not address the question of the optimal decision in the presence of uncertainty because they do not suggest what to do when the set of possible costs and outcomes include ones that would make the cost-effectiveness ratio fail to meet the chosen threshold for cost-effectiveness.
In assessing these methods, it is interesting to note that while all of them appear to have some significance for the objectives described in the preceding section, none of them are explicitly linked to that set of objectives. To address this, we now use an expected utility maximization model to attempt to examine optimal decisions about treatment and the acquisition of additional information under uncertainty. We begin by describing a model of optimal decision making under uncertainty and then extend that model to calculate the expected value of information gained by research.
A Deterministic Model of Health Outcomes with Uncertainty about Effectiveness
To focus our analysis of uncertainty, we assume that there is uncertainty abo ut the effectiveness (θ ∈ Θ) of a medical intervention (m) but that the outcome of a medical intervention given θ is certain.
By making this assumption, we abstract from the problem of uncertainty in outcome for an individual, and focus instead on uncertainty for a "representative consumer", but the basic results are easily extended to the more general case . To model uncertainty in both the costs and benefits of an intervention, we allow both utility (U) and the costs of the medical intervention (c) to depend directly on θ. In addition, we let utility depend on non-medical consumption (x) and medical expenditure so that U = U(m, θ, x(θ)) and c = c(m,θ). Here x is written as x(θ) to denote the fact that x will vary with θ for any m to satisfy the budget constraint c(m, θ) + x(θ) -I = 0 for each level of effectiveness. To model costeffectiveness, we assume that people maximize expected utility 3 and take the example of a representative consumer who maximizes expected utility subject to a budget constraint conditional on each level of effectiveness:
This can then be rewritten as a LaGrange multiplier problem in which the λ (θ) is the multiplier for the budget constraint for each level of θ, which are multiplied by p(θ) without loss of generality to yield:
This generates a first order condition for medical expenditure which is:
This condition implies that investment in a medical intervention should occur to the point at which its expected marginal benefit (utility) equals the expected value of the marginal-utility-of-income-weighted marginal cost. Permitting the marginal utility of income to be dependent on θ reflects the possibility that, either because of changes in the utility function or changes in costs due to θ, income might have a greater or lesser marginal utility.
For an individual, these effects of uncertainty about the costs and effectiveness of medical interventions on the marginal utility of income are clearly plausible and potentially important. If someone has hip replacement for arthritis at age 55 and then suffers a severe complication, is forced into early retirement, and requires around-the-clock care, both their utility and medical costs will be directly affected and their marginal utility of income could change substantially. In a population, however, such effects are far less compelling because insurance can equate the marginal utility of income across health states unless an intervention leads to an extraordinarily large change in either population health or costs.
Thinking from a population perspective in which most extremely expensive medical interventions affect a relatively small number of persons and most common medical interventions are relatively modest in cost, it is much less likely that the (aggregate) marginal utility of income will change substantially with uncertainty about the costs or benefits of a single intervention 4 . If this is the case, then limλ (θ)→λ and the first order condition for medical expenditures converges to:
which implies that the cost-effectiveness ratio is:
Thus expected utility maximization implies that the optimum cost-effectiveness ratio of an intervention in a population under uncertainty is closely approximated by the ratio of expected costs to expected benefits.
Note that this "ratio of means" solution is analogous to that suggested by Stinnett and Paltiel (1997) as the solution to a constrained optimization problem in a linear programming context and by Claxton (1998) in a Bayesian discrete choice decision theoretic context. However, neither analysis derives the result directly from a formal utility maximization model nor addresses the possible dependency of the marginal utility of income on θ.
While this argument about the dependence of the marginal utility of income on θ has not been made previously within the context of medical cost-effectiveness analysis, it should be noted that the argument is quite similar to that made by Arrow and Lind (1970) concerning the evaluation of risk in public investment decisions. In that article, the authors argue that the large scale on which the public sector exists allows it to effectively eliminate any welfare loss associated with the riskiness of investments by spreading the risk across a sufficiently large population. The argument here relies both on this diversification effect and the relatively modest magnitude of almost any one public health care decision in the context of overall health and health expenditures.
Sensitivity Analysis to Guide Individual or Subgroup Decisions
When sensitivity analysis is done to guide decisions for individuals or subgroups, the problem is essentially the same as for the total population, except that some of the parameters in the parameter vector θ have a different probability distribution p' (θ) than in the overall population. Accordingly, the optimal decision for individuals or subgroups is again the ratio of the expected value of costs to the expected value of benefits, only using the appropriate prior probability distribution for the subgroup or individual.
Application to a Stylized Decision Concerning a Treatment of Uncertain Benefit
Figure 1 describes a stylized decision concerning an intervention of uncertain benefit. For simplicity, the intervention is assumed to cost $10,000 with certainty. Uncertainty is assumed to exist only with respect to benefits; it is assumed that there is a 90% chance that the benefit is 0.1 life-year, but also a 5% chance each that the benefit is 0.01 or 1 life year.
Taking these three possibilities individually, the cost-effectiveness ratios are $100,000, $1,000,000, or $10,000 respectively. If one used a cutoff of $100,000 per life-year, a traditional sensitivity analysis would therefore be indeterminate. Such indeterminacy is, in fact, an extremely common result in cost-effectiveness analyses. Another limitation of this standard approach is that, while the cost-effectiveness ratios tell us something about the magnitude of the benefits relative to the cost, they do not provide any indication of how to relate the magnitude of those benefits to their likelihood.
Common approaches to sensi tivity analysis might take other perspectives. For example, the stochastic cost-effectiveness approach might conclude that since there is only a 5% chance that the intervention is not cost-effective, it should be selected. On the other hand, the same approach could be used to argue that since there is only a 5% chance that the intervention will provide a benefit in excess of its cost, it should not be selected. The problem with these perspectives is that they do not reflect the magnitude of potential benefits relative to costs.
Following the expected utility approach described above, the expected cost is $10,000 and the expected benefit is: 0.05*0.01 + 0.9*0.1 + 0.05*1.0 = 0.0005 + 0.09 + 0.05 = 0.1405 life-years. Thus the cost-effectiveness ratio is $10,000 / 0.1405 life-years = $71,174/life-year saved, which is clearly costeffective by the $100,000 per life-year standard. Even though the chance that the intervention is highly beneficial is only 5%, more than one-third (0.05/0.1405=36%) of the expected benefit comes from the unlikely event that it is highly effective. It is this ability to incorporate both the magnitude and likelihood of benefits and costs into a single statistic that can be used to guide decision-making that is the primary advantage of the expected value approach over the traditional approaches that incorporate only one or the other dimension, and often result in indeterminate conclusions that do not provide much guidance for decision making.
Sensitivity Analysis to Guide Information Collection
Having used the expected utility approach to study how to identify the optimal decision under uncertainty given available information, we now use the approach to examine when the collection of additional information is likely to be worthwhile. When a study is done to accumulate improved information concerning parameters in a decision model, the value of information is the change in expected utility that comes from a change in uncertainty about the parameters. Although this fundamental principle dates back at least to the pioneers of statistical decision theory (e.g. Raiffa and Schlaifer, 1961 ; Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer, 1965) , it has not been commonly used in developing techniques for sensitivity analysis in medical decision analysis. Indeed, when formal techniques for clinical trial design have been implemented (e.g. O' Brien et al., 1994; Al, van Hout et al., 1998; Briggs and Gray, 1998) , they have often been based on criteria for decision making such as confidence intervals around the cost-effectiveness ratio, which generate suboptimal results for the same reasons as the problems with threshold approaches to sensitivity analysis that are described above. Two exceptions to this are Claxton and Posnett (1996) and Hornberger (1998) , which focus on the determination of optimal sample size for a clinical trial from a cost-effectiveness perceptive in a full Bayesian context.
Adopting the expected utility approach, assume that for any information set describing the parameter distribution, p(θ), there is an optimal choice of m as described above. Call this m*( p(θ)). This implies an expected utility with existing information (EU 0 ) of:
Now imagine that we are able to acquire additional information about θ. Assume further that the cost of this research is c r . Though the analysis is easily generalized to permit an infinite number of possible outcomes of the experiment 5 , assume for simplicity that there are only two possible outcomes of this experiment: with probability q that the distribution of θ is found to be p' ( θ) and with probability (1-q) that it is found to be p' ' ( θ), where, for consistency with the initial prior distribution, q*p' ( θ) +(1-q)* p' ' ( θ) = p(θ). In these cases, the optimal level of medical expenditure will be m*(p'( θ)) and m*(p''( θ)) and the expected level of utility is:
Where x*' ( θ) and x*''( θ) are determined from the budget constraint net of research costs c r (i.e.
c(m, θ) + x(θ) + c r -I = 0 for all θ) . It follows that the change in expected utility with the collection of information, or expected value of information (EVI) is:
If this is positive then the study is worth performing, if not, then it should not be performed.
Although this value of information calculation is easily described in theoretical terms, the ability to implement this approach depends on the ability to assemble meaningful information on the prior probabilities of the parameters required for the calculation, and these may be very difficult to obtain. In some instances, these may be estimated based on published studies that report means and confidence intervals that may then be used to describe the full distribution of parameter values. In other instances, primary data collection may be required. Still, it is likely that in a significant number of cases it will not be possible to identify much information that will inform priors. Moreover, it may be quite difficult to say much about how an experiment is likely to affect the posterior distributions of the parameters.
These empirical challenges suggest that techniques for assessing the value of information that do not rely on this data concerning prior or posterior distributions would be highly useful. In the case where information on priors is available, one such possibility is the expected value of perfect
, where m*(θ) is the optimal choice of m if θ is known.
Since the expected value of information is always positive 6 , this provides an upper bound on the ideal value of information calculations described above. From a practical point, however, the advantage of the EVPI calculation is that it does not depend on the posteriors. Indeed, this is probably one reason why the EVPI approach has been used in the cost-effectiveness literature (e.g. Felli and Hazen, 1998) 7 .
Although EVPI is simpler to determine than EVI, it still depends on knowledge of the priors. An alternative measure that did not depend on this might also be useful. One such measure is the maximal value of information (MVI) over all possible values of θ ∈ Θ, MVB MaxU m = ∈ θ θ Θ ( *( )) . Although this will also only be an upper bound on EVPI and, therefore, EVI, it depends only on knowledge of the value function conditional on θ. Despite the fact that it may be a relatively crude upper bound, it is worthwhile to note that this criterion in fact corresponds to that implied by a threshold analysis in which the bounds are determined by the extreme values of the parameter (assuming, as is usually done, that the value function is monotonic with respect to the parameters). Thus, application of the threshold technique based on the full range of possible values of a parameter can be considered a bound on the more general value of information calculation, only with less rigorous information requirements. Thus, like EVPI, the threshold technique based on the full range of possible values a parameter might take can be considered a method for placing an upper bound on the more complex EVI calculation. When these calculations suggest the MVI or EVPI is low, the full EVI calculation is not necessary. Note, in contrast, that the common practices of assessing cost-effectiveness at a 95% confidence interval for a parameter or calculating stochastic cost-effectiveness intervals have no clear theoretical justification.
Thinking more broadly, if Θ is enlarged to include any possible conceivable value of θ, even if those values are excluded under current technology, this type of reasoning can be extended to consider any possible research on the parameter in question. For example, if the probability of cure with the best current treatment for a disease is known to be between 20 and 40 percent with certainty and the treatment is found not to be worthwhile (perhaps because of morbidity), one could calculate whether treatment would be worthwhile if the cure rate were 100 percent. This might be called the maximum value of research (MVR), and, in turn, can be used to generate an upper bound on MVI that does not require any data at all concerning the parameter in question. The MVR concept could also be expanded to consider innovations that led to fundamental changes in the structure of the decision tree, and not just the effects of changes in its parameters.
Application to a Stylized Model of the Decision whether to Treat Prostate Cancer
In order to illustrate the approaches described above, this section examines a simplified model of the decision to treat prostate cancer. A highly stylized model is chosen in order to focus attention on the methods described rather than the specific application. In this simplified model (Figure 2) , the decision to treat prostate cancer is viewed as a decision between radical prostatectomy (surgical removal of the prostate) and "watchful waiting" (no intervention unless the disease is found to spread). This decision is represented by the two decision nodes in the middle of the decision tree in Figure 2 . In this simplified model, radical prostatectomy is assumed to be curative, so that the patient lives out a normal life expectancy of 25 years. Radical prostatectomy is major surgery, however, and carries the risk of immediate death, which is assumed to occur 5% of the time. The outcome of watchful waiting will depend on how quickly the prostate cancer progresses. Many cancers will progress slowly enough that men die of other causes before they die of prostate cancer and thus live a "normal" life expectancy (assumed here to be 25 years). Other men will progress rapidly and die of prostate cancer (assumed here to occur at 10 years). For simplicity, we assume that quality of life is not a concern in prostate cancer treatment so that outcomes are measured in life years, which are the same as quality-adjusted life years.
Radical prostatectomy is assumed to cost $10,000 and the basic future costs of survival are assumed to be $20,000 per year.
However, the natural history of prostate cancer is not as well understood as suggested by these assumptions. In fact there is a great deal of uncertainty even about average rates of progression to death from prostate cancer -i.e. how aggressive the disease is on average. This is the dimension of uncertainty on which we focus in this example. This is captured in a stylized way in Figure 2 by the upper and lower decision trees that differ in the fraction of tumors that will progress rapidly (0.085 in the "non-aggressive" case, and 0.2 in the "aggressive" case). Though of course some other fraction in between or near these two might be imagined to be correct, we assume for simplicity here that one or the other of these values is precisely correct.
Panels 1 and 2 of Table 4 show the results of a cost-effectiveness analysis of the treatment decision in the non-aggressive and aggressive cases. In both cases, treatment provides a benefit, but in the first case it is a small benefit with a cost per QALY of $420,000 and in the second case it is a much larger benefit with a cost per QALY of only $26,000. If we assume for simplicity that the cutoff for costeffectiveness is $100,000 per QALY, then the optimal decision in the first case would be watchful waiting, while in the second case it would be treatment.
The left most part of the decision tree reflects the fact that we do not know which of these two possibilities might be the case and places some prior probabilities on the two arms (0.2 aggressive, 0.8 non-aggressive). Panel 3 of Table 4 reports the expected benefits and costs of the screening decision when these priors are held. In that case, the ratio of the expected costs to expected benefits is $47,000, which would be cost-effective by the $100,000/QALY standard. This might be considered surprising because the assumption was that there was an 80 percent chance that the progression was not aggressive, and treatment is not even close to being cost-effective by the $100,000/QALY standard in that case. The result is driven by the 20 percent chance that the benefit could be much larger, despite the fact that that possibility is not very likely. This points out the potential for the ratio of the expected value approach to generate different results than approaches that do not account for both the magnitude and likelihood of the potential benefits.
We now turn to the question of whether the collection of additional information would be of value. Following the approach described above, we begin with calculation of the maximum value of information. This calculation can be done in a variety of ways requiring progressively more information.
To take an extreme example, assume that we knew nothing about the probability that prostate cancer is aggressive, but only the life expectancy of patients with aggressive cancers who are treated or not treated, and the price of prostatectomy. In the absence of knowledge about the probability that cancers would progress rapidly, there is no clear guidance about whether watchful waiting or prostatectomy dominates, so we therefore consider both cases as reference cases. Assume first that we decide that no treatment will be the reference point. To get an upper bound on the value of information, one could use only information on the life expectancy of treated and untreated patients and assume that all patients have aggressive cancers. Specifically, assuming that all men who have prostate cancer but are not treated live 10 years (QALYs), while those who are treated live 25 years (QALYs), the value of treatment per patient would be 15 QALYs*$100,000/QALY = $1.5 Million per patient. Alternatively, we could assume that that treatment would be the reference case, in which case the benefit of finding out that treatment was not cost-effective would be the cost savings from avoiding prostatectomy ($10,000/patient) and avoidance of treatment-related mortality (0.05 mortality*25 years maximum life expectancy*$100,000/QALY = $125,000/patient), which add to $135,000 per patient.
If one were then to use this knowledge of the maximum value of information for a patient to make a decision about whether investment in a study to resolve the ambiguity about the aggressiveness of prostate cancer would be worthwhile, one might multiply these numbers by the number of men who are found to have prostate cancer annually (100,000) and divide by some real interest rate (0.03) to reflect the discounted value of the value of that information over time to get the maximum value of information (MVI): $1.5 Million*100,000/0.03 = $5 Trillion if the baseline strategy is watchful waiting and $0.135 Million*100,000/0.03 = $450 Billion if the baseline strategy is prostatectomy. These extremely large estimates of the maximum value of information suggest that there is the potential for information of immense value to come from knowledge about the efficacy of prostate cancer treatment. This value of information is large relative to the cost of any conceivable clinical trial.
Of course these maximum value of information calculations represent an upper bound, and a fair interpretation of these findings is that the MVI approach is simply not informative in this case, despite its analytical simplicity and independence of assumptions about the probabilities that cancers are aggressive.
This suggests that it is worthwhile to pursue the expected value of perfect information (EVPI) approach.
The EVPI approach is described in panel 4 of Table 4 . The panel describes the expected value of three strategies: watchful waiting, radical prostatectomy, and the optimal decision with perfect knowledge of the actual average progression rate (EVPI). The last two columns calculate the value of the change in QALYs (assuming $100,000 per QALY for illustration) and the net incremental benefit of the policy choice compared to the strategy immediately above it in the table.
The first point to note is that if one made policy based on the most likely cost effectiveness ratio ($420,000), one would choose watchful waiting, but if one chose based on the ratio of the expected values, one would choose radical prostatectomy, which yields a net benefit of ($26,000-$6,400=) $19,600 per patient relative to watchful waiting. This is a quantified measure of the expected gain from the improvement in decision making by using the mean of the expected values as opposed to basing the decision on the most likely cost-effectiveness ratio, as is generally done in the "base case" reported by most current cost-effectiveness analyses.
The second point to note is that the expected value of the gain versus watchful waiting with perfect information is even higher at $26,000 per patient. This implies an additional gain of $6,400 per patient from perfect information compared to the best possible decision with the initial information.
Converting this patient level estimate of the value of research into a population level estimate as above suggests an EVPI of $6,400*100,000/0.03 = $21 billion. As with the MVPI, this large EVPI suggests that the expected value of perfect information about the efficacy of prostate cancer treatment would indeed be quite large relative to the cost of almost any conceivable clinical trial.
Of course this too is an upper bound on the expected value of information that would come from any actual clinical trial, since any clinical trial is likely to provide less than perfect information. Panel 5 examines one such case in which an experiment is done that has two possible outcomes: a 50 percent probability of an outcome that suggests that the probability that prostate cancer is aggressive is 0.05 and a 50 percent probability of an outcome that suggests that the probability that prostate cancer is aggressive is 0.35. (Note this preserves the prior that the probability that prostate cancer is aggressive is 0.2 since 0.5*0.05+0.5*0.35 = 0.2.) The expected value of outcomes from watchful waiting and radical prostatectomy given these two possible outcomes of the experiment are reported in the upper and lower parts of panel 5. In the first case, the optimal decision switches to watchful waiting as compared to prostatectomy with the initial information, which yields a net surplus of $600 per patient. In the second case, prostatectomy remains the optimal choice, so there is no additional benefit to having done the study.
Thus the expected net benefit is 0.5*$600 = $300 per patient. A decision about the study might be made by comparing its cost to the expected value of the information (EVI): $300*100,000/0.03 = $1 billion.
Therefore, the value of this study would be quite large, although substantially less than the upper bound suggested by the EVPI.
In theory, in a similar manner, all possible experiments concerning all other dimensions of the model might be examined to determine whether they would be worthwhile. In this way, it might be determined how much could be gained by improved sensitivity and specificity of screening tests, decreased complications of treatment, improved risk stratification prior to treatment, and so on. To meaningfully model prostate cancer screening and treatment for such an exercise, the model one would have to construct would need to be vastly more complex than the simplified example described here (Figure 3 ). Both the data and computational demands of such an exercise would be formidable, especially in the construction of priors, and this would certainly require reliance on some of the approaches to bound the actual value of information, as suggested above. Clearly, there has been no attempt in this example to suggest that a comprehensive attempt to perform a precise calculation of the type described would generate results anything resembling these in magnitude. However, these simplified calculations do illustrate the types of calculations that might be performed to assess the value of research, including more simple calculations such as the EVPI that require less information. How informative such calculations would be in practice is an unresolved empirical question.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed the tools of medical cost-effectiveness analysis and examined the potential to use those tools to inform priorities for biomedical research. As suggested by some recent policy analysts, it is possible in principle to construct measures of the value of information that can describe the benefits of investing in research. The work required to move from what is theoretically possible to the actual application of these principles to produce valid and reliable estimates of the value of research involves a series of methodological and empirical challenges. We have already discussed many of these methodological challenges above, including issues related to perspective, the measurement of benefits and the measurement of costs. Additional issues include ambiguities about how costs of illness may affect quality of life measurements and the implications of such effects for the measurement of productivity costs (Meltzer and Johannesson, 1999) , and basic issues about how risk at the individual level may affect welfare that are essentially ignored by the assumptions that perfect insurance is available and that people maximize expected utility (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) 8 .
At an empirical level, there are important challenges in developing meaningful priors concerning the parameters of decision models (e.g., probabilities, quality of life values, discount rates, etc.). As discussed above, this may often require extensive review of existing data, primary data collection, or even sometimes analyses based on a variety of arbitrary priors. It may also be very difficult to determine priors for the likelihood that a research project will find a meaningful result. Whether it is possible to adequately address these challenges will be resolved only through efforts to apply these ideas empirically.
While some of the empirical challenges can be addressed by bounding the calculations using concepts such as the expected value of perfect information and maximum value of information, it is possible that such bounds may not be very informative, as suggested by our example in which the maximum value of information is $5 Trillion while the expected value of information is only $1 Billion, or 0.02% of the total.
To apply these approaches to assess the value of research, there are also a variety of additional challenges. These include the interdependence of the benefits of research projects on related topics, the possibility that the research might become less (or more) valuable over time if other technological or demographic changes arise that alter the management, frequency or natural history of the disease, and the unpredictability of how the results of research (particularly basic research) might be useful in areas outside the initial areas of inquiry. The difficulty of these issues implies that the sort of formal analyses suggested here are more likely to be of use for evaluating clinical research than for evaluating basic research.
Despite the theoretical and empirical issues raised by this work, the importance of making good decisions about the allocation of resources to medical interventions and medical research suggest that work in this area be an important priority. In considering whether formal approaches based on the tools of cost-effectiveness analysis are likely to have much influence on priority setting, it is encouraging that the recent report of the Institute of Medicine on improving priority setting at the NIH recommended that:
"In setting priorities, NIH should strengthen its analysis and use of health data, such as burdens and costs of diseases, and on data on the impact of research on the health of the public. (p. 11)" (Institute of Medicine, 1998) . Nevertheless, it is essential that efforts to improve the process by which research funds are allocated and better understand the value of research accurately reflect the considerable difficulty of those tasks. In that context, it is encouraging that, with papers such as those presented here, economists are beginning to turn their attention towards understanding the value of medical research. As this work continues, it will be important to keep in mind that-even with evidence that some treatments may have little value at the margin and limited evidence about the connection between research and gains in healthhealth is a domain that people value very highly and in which great strides have been made in recent decades. 
